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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

BERT T. McKee,
Plaintiff and Applicant,
vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, and
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON
PIPE COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants.

CASE
NO. 7258

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
Certiorari to review the decision of the Industrial Commission denying compensation to Bert T. McKee for back
injuries sustained while an employee of Pacific States Cast
Iron Pipe Company.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References hereafter are to the pages of the record as
the pages of the file and transcripts are consecutively numbered in red on such original record.
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The applicant, Bert T. McKee, was originally employed
by the defendant company in 1935 (66). Prior to the year
1937, he had no trouble with his back, despite his engaging
in heavy farm and other work (68, 93; see also Applicant's
Exhibit "C"). In 1937, while employed by Pacific States
Cast Iron Pipe Company, an employer subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act (57), he suffered a sudden and
paintful injury as the result of an industrial accident (67,
70). He was paid compensation by his employer for a week
or so as a result thereof and thereupon was told by the
company doctor that he was all right and returned to work
(70).
Between 1937 and 1944, he worked intermittently for
the Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe- Company and others, without difficulty with his back, thinking it was all right (71),
until February of the latter year, when while employed
by the defendant company, he suffered a further violent,
sudden back injury in lifting heavy pipe in the course of his
employment (72). Something snapped in his back, and he
doubled up (73). This injury was reported to his foreman,
who told him to go home (72). He left work on account
thereof, reporting first to a chiropractor (73) and thereafter to Dr. Orton, and then to Fred Taylor, the company
doctor (73, 95).
Dr. Taylor had x-rays taken of the applicant, and after
his examination of·them, reported by letter to the company,
(Applicant's Exhibit "A"), and also verbally to applicant
(73, 95) that there was no injury to McKee's back, but that
his difficulty was "muscle spasm", "lumbago" or "rheumati&m", requiring a change in occupation and that he should
never do. any more manual labor by reason thereof. Even
after Dr. Taylor looked at the x-rays, he told McKee his
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back was all right (74); no one except Dr. Taylor and the
pipe company had the benefit of those x-rays until the hearing (87, 110).
The pipe company released McKee in 1944 because of
the recommendation of Dr. Taylor, and McKee, relying upon the diagnosis of this company doctor (74) sought other
employment (76). He began to experience recurring difficulty with his back. Assuming, upon Dr. Taylor's advice,
that it was rheumatism or some other difficulty not connected with accident (76) he sought the services of another
physician who, knowing of Dr. Taylor's diagnosis after xrays, accepted and relied upon such diagnosis (82, 103, 109),
and treated Mr. McKee for muscular spasms and rheumatism until 1946, when because of the severity of the back
difficulty, he had other x-rays taken (10), which led to an
examination by Dr. PaulS. Richards, of Bingham Canyon,
in 1947, and the diagnosis definitely of an unstable fifth lumbar vertebrae (20). In fact, Dr. Taylor's x-rays show€d
the same condition that subsequent x-rays revealed (159),
and it was only when Dr. Orton's x-rays were taken in 1946
that McKee was put on notice in any way of his back injury (77). Dr. Paul Richards later diagnosed the condition
as an unstable fifth lumbar vertebrae, and advised a spinal
fusion (104, 158).
His right leg started to "drag" in 1946, although he
continued his employment in a service station (76-77).
Since then the difficulty has gotten worse, with more pain
and more paralysis or paralyzing effect (78). In November, 1947, he was put in bed and weights were put on his
leg. He was confined for eight weeks at that time (78),
but later returned to work at the service station, where he
is now experiencing extreme difficulty (79, 97).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is undisputed that the x-rays taken by the company's

physician, Dr. Taylor, showed the back defect (159), and
yet, not only did Dr. Taylor assure the defendant that nothing was wrong with his back and that his sole difficulty
was muscular spasms, rheumatism or lumbago, but at his
own doctor's suggestion, and in accordance with the suggestion of the Industrial Commission, McKee, prior to filing his application, asked for an opportunity to have his
physician examine the x-rays and the company refused to
let him have them! (79-80).
The record is especially clear and undisputed that the
applicant, McKee, as well as his family physician, Dr. Orton, relied upon Dr. Taylor, and the assurance of this doctor acting in the capacity of the company doctor, and also
representatives of the company, that there was nothing
wrong with his back (173, 50, 96, 167), until during 19461947, as a result of additional x-rays taken by Dr. Orton
and the diagnosis of Dr. Richards, it was discovered that
the difficulty was not lumbago, muscular spasms or rheumatism, but a substantial back injury, apparent not only
on Dr. Orton's and Dr. Richards' x-rays, but also on the
very x-rays which the company doctor had before him when
he assured McKee that there was nothing wrong with his
back. It is also undisputed that McKee's paralysis is becoming more marked, and that now he has difficulty in doing even light work.
.The. applicant is married and has two minor children
(65-66). His rate of pay was fifty-seven cents per hour,
working five days per week (14, 66).
The Industrial Commission, after hearing the testimony adduced by the parties and reviewing the exhibits
received and made a part of the record, found that the ap-
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plicant did sustain an injury by accident arising out of, or
in the course of, his employment on February 21st, 1944;
that the applicant, while carrying and stacking 5-foot pipe,
felt something snap in his back which caused terrific pain;
that on May 28th, 1948, the applicant filed an application
for a hearing for compensation benefits; that all jurisdictional facts were admitted by the defendant except that the
applicant suffered an accidental injury, as found by the
Commission, and that the application for compensation was
filed more than four years after the date of the accident
(47-48).
The Commission concluded in view of the provisions
of Section 42-1-92, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and of the
fact that the applicant did not file his application within
three years from the date of the injury that the application
should be denied, and it was so ordered (48).
An application for re-hearing on the ground that the
Commission erred in concluding that the claim was barred
was duly filed (49), but was denied by the Commission
(52).

ERRORS RELIED UPON AND QUESTIONS
FOR DETERMINATION

Since it has been conceded, or has been found by the
Commission, that the employer was subject to the Act, that
the applicant did sustain an injury arising out of his employment, and that all other· jurisdictional facts prerequisite to an award are present, the only question that remains
is whether the claim of Bert T. McKee is barred by any
statute of limitations. If the claim is barred, the decision
of the Industrial Commission must be upheld; if the claim
is not barred, either by reason of estoppel to raise the statSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ute, waiver of the statute, or otherwise, the applicant is entitled to compensation.
Thus is raised the sole question in this case-whether
applicant's claim is barred by the statute of ljmitations in
view of the facts established by the record.

ARGUMENT
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY
ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, AND THE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED FROlVl RELYING UPON ANY SUCH
STATUTE.
Section 42-1-92, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides
in part as follows:
"If no claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within three years from the date
of the accident or the datae of last payment of compensation, the right to compensation shall be wholly
barred.''

The general statute of limitations, Sec. 104-2-24.10,
also provides:
"An action for a liability created by the statutes
of this State, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this State, except where in special cases
a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of
this State, shall be commenced within three years."
In the case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission,
93 Utah 510, 74 P. 2d 657, it was held, contrary to earlier
cases, that the duty to pay workmen's compensation does
not arise until there is an accident and injury and disability
and loss from injury, and the cause of action arises when
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the employer refuses or ceases to pay compensation after
the duty arises in such manner.
In Hallstrom v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 85, 83
P. 2d 730, the same rule was adhered to, but under the facts,
the "compensable" injury was held to have existed for
about six years, and compensation was therefore denied.
The Supreme Court in Williams v. Industrial Commission, 95 Utah 376, 81 P. 2d l349, reversed the decision of
the Industrial Commission and held that where the files of
the Industrial Commission and the testimony did not reveal when the impairment of employee's eye became noticeable, nor when the loss of sight became complete, and
the Commission made no findings in either particular, nor
as to whether the disability was due to the accident, a ruling that the one year statute of limitations began to run
from the date of accident was error.
The evidence disclosed as to McKee that he continued
to work with regularity until 1946, when he experienced
partial paralysis; and there is no showing that his actual
disability, except for the advice of Dr. Taylor, which we
shall notice later, began more than three years before he
filed his application.
All of the Utah cases seem to leave open the question
of just what is a "compensable accident" which starts the
time running under L. 39, Ch. 51, which amended the existing law, under which the above mentioned cases were decided, by adding the provision above quoted from Sec. 421-92, UCA, 1943. It is believed that upon the basis of principle, McKee's accident did not become compensable until
within three years from the filing of his application. It is
further believed that should the legislature by the 1939
amendment have intended, or should the statute be conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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strued to provide for, the limitation of an industrial accident claim solely on the basis of the time of the happening
of an accident, without reference to whether there was any
disability, .such statute as so interpreted or intended would
be unconstitutional as a deprivation of life, liberty and
property without due process of law as applied to disability
first becoming manifest after the three years. This would
follow from the fact that the general workmen's compensataion statute would preclude a recovery within the three
years by reason of the absence of disability, and the limitation statute would preclude recovery thereafter. Thus,
a fundamental right would be effectually precluded, without redress of any kind.
Under other circumstances, we would be glad to further argue these questions, for our position is that the action is not barred under the doctrine of the Salt Lake City
case, supra, even in view of the 1939 amendment. However,
there is another principle directly involved herein which
appearSj determinative, and which seems to remove any
doubt that might otherwise exist as to the interpretation
of the amended statute.
Following McKee's accident of February, 1944, he reported to Dr. Fred R. Taylor, who was admitted to be the
regular doctor for, and representing, the pipe company, in
order to get a clearance to go back to work. Dr. Taylor
took x-rays of applicant's back, and, after having examined
such x-rays, wrote the following letter to the Pacific States
Cast Iron Pipe Company, giving substantially the same information orally to Mr. McKee:
Applicant's Exhibit "A" (Received in evidence, 62-63)
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Dr. Fred W. Taylor
Dr. Fred R. Taylor
Dr. Albert R. Taylor
Taylor
Clinic
Physicians and Surgeons
Provo, Utah
March 14, 1944
Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co.
Provo, Utah

re: Bert McKee

Gentlemen:
Mr. McKee reported to the office Feb. 28, 1944 because of pain in his back. He had been under the care
of a chiropractor for some time who said his back was
in place.
X-rays were taken which showed no bony deformity. General examination showed no infection of the
sinuses, tonsils slightly red, teeth-upper false, lower
in good condition. Heart and lungs normal, blood pressure 120/70, abdomen no masses, no tenderness, prostate average size, no pus, urine negative. Back lists
to right, muscles in spasm, movements limited.
Straight leg raising difficult, and both leg raising impossible.
In view of these findings a diagnosis of lumbago
was made, and he was advised to seek a change of occupation. There is a history of similar condition occurring when he was working for your company before,
and he states he has had no trouble since that time.
Very truly,

jsj Fred R. Taylor
FRT/hw
(RECEIVED Mar 16 1944
P.S.C.I.P.CO.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the hearing it was testified by Dr. Paul Richards,
and not disputed by the defendant, that Dr. Taylor's own
x-rays, which he had before him at the time of writing his
letter, showed the slipping in the lumbar region which was
the cause of Mr. McKee's difficulty; in fact, Dr. Richards
said Dr. Taylor's x-rays showed the same condition as the
subsequent x-rays showed (159). Neither lumbago nor
rheumatism was indicated, and muscular spasms would
simply be a symptom of this back condition.
It is also undisputed in the record that applicant and
those doctors whom applicant consulted after he was released from work because of Dr. Taylor's recommendation
and his assumed condition of "muscular spasms" and "lumbago", relied upon Dr. Taylor's finding, particularly because he alone had the benefit of the x-rays. Can the pipe
company, then, take advantage of the mistake or fraud of
its own representative and bar a claim because an employee
took the word of such representative who was in the best
position to know what the fact was?

Even in 1947, when the continued and increasing difficulty led to the taking of other x-rays, the pipe company
withheld the 1944 x-rays and the true condition of the employee, and particulars of his condition had to be ascertained on the basis of independent inquiry, without any
Some of the difficooperation from the pipe company.
culty that the applicant was laboring under, and also
the fact that even before his formal application was filed,
he applied to the Industrial Commission for aid, are indicated by applicant's Exhibit "H", which is a letter he wrote
to the Industrial Commission under date of September 1,
1947, as follows:
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Spanish Fork, Utah
RECEIVED
Sept 1st 1947
(
Sept 3 1947
(The Industrial Com-)
( mission of Utah )
Dear Sirs:
In regards to the information concerning the Back
Injury I came in last week and seen you about. I could
get the reports from Dr. Orton, and I am sending them
just as he gave them to us. Dr. Taylor has turned all
reports including the Xrays over to the Pipe Plant.
They would show them to me but refused to give any
of the dates. They said if you wanted them you could
get them by writing for them. They have all of the
dates and also a letter from Dr. Taylor saying he
treated me for my Injurys.
We will be expecting to hear from you soon concerning this trouble.
Sincerely Yours

js/ Bert McKee
My Address: Bert T. McKee
328 East 4th N.
Spanish Fork, Utah

We desire to quote also from the testimony of the pipe
company's office manager, Mr. Shaw (118-119).
BY MR. LOWE:
"Q.
Do you remember an occasion sometime in
1947 when Mr. McKee came to your office and asked
to be shown certain documents and x-rays?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Can you place the approximate date?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. No, I can't place an exact date. It appears in
my mind that he came to my office sometime in the
fall. I didn't write down the date or anything pertaining to it. Ot that time I recommended or told Mr.
McKee that if he wanted the x-rays that we would submit them to the Commission, or any other information
he desired.
Q. That was sometime in the fall of 1947?
A. Yes, but I can't fix a date on it.
Q. Do you know it was after the spring of 1947.
A. Yes, it seems it was sometime last fall.
MR. LOWE:

That is all"

BY MR. CHRISTENSON:
"You had the x-rays how long before Mr. McKee
came to see you?
A. Oh, the x-rays have been in our possession
since Dr. Taylor turned them over to us.
Q. And that was probably shortly after they
were taken?
A. I don't know when they were turned over to
us.
Q. So far as you know they had been for a long
time?
A. I think so.
Q. And you also didn't give Mr. McKee any statement of his work record, did you?
A. No sir.
Q. He asked for it.
A. Yes.
Q. And you declined to give him that?
A. I declined to give him that because I didn't
feel there was any justification for him coming into our
office and examining the records other than through
an order.
Q. That would be the attitude of the company?
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A. I think that is the attitude of the company.
It just does not want anyone promiscuously going
through these records.
Q. Did he ask you about seeing his own work
record?
A. Yes.
Q. Now you figured the x-rays were company
property?
A. I thought so.
Q. They are taken by the regular company physician?
A. Yes.
Q. For the company?
A. Yes.
Q. And he was asking for them?
A. Yes."
McKee's application was filed well within three years
from the discovery of the misrepresentation of the pipe
company's doctor and the concealment of the pipe company. To say that a workman under such circumstances
must be turned away without assistance which he otherwise would justly merit, simply because he did not file his
application before he discovered the representations of his
employer with respect to his condition were false, would
constitute the n1ost keen injustice. Fortunately, no rule
of law with respect to limitation or otherwise requires such
a result.
We refer to the case of Anderson v. Contract Trucking
Co. (New Mexico) 146 P. (2d) 873, for the application of
the principle upon which we rely. There, where an employee at the time of injury to his eye was led to believe
by the company doctor that the injury was trivial and attributed growing eye weakness to natural causes, and did
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
not discover that his eyesight was practically gone until
consulting an eye specialist more than two years thereafter,
his claim for compensation, which was filed within the
statutory time after the discovery of the seriousness of the
injury, was not barred.
It matters not whether the 1944 accident, concerning
which there is no dispute, was the sole cause of the present
condition, or united with the result of the 1937 accident, or
a congenital condition, to cause the disability found by the
Commission. The 1944 accident was an industrial accident arising out of, and in the course of employment and a
cause of the subsequent arid present disability. Even were
there some question about this, the Industrial Commission
should resolve doubts in favor of the applicant and his dependents, and grant compensation, as the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed. Salt Lake City
v. Industrial Commission, et al, 104 Utah 436, 140 P. 2d
644 . Here, there is not a question of resolving doubts in
favor of applicant. The record shows without substantial
dispute that applicant did, in 1944, ~uffer an industrial accident in the course of, and arising out of, his employment,
and is now seriously disabled as a result thereof. The only
question remaining is whether his claim is barred, and that
is a question of law which the record, we submit, requires
to be answered in favor of the applicant.
There is no doubt that applicant's foreman knew immediately of the accident in 1944 and, in fact, told him to
go home. It has been repeatedly held that this satisfies
the statute with respect to notice to employer. There is no
question, moreover, that if an application has been filed any
time within three years from the 1944 accident, compensation would have to be allowed. Yet, the pipe company's
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doctor precluded the prompt filing of a claim by his statements to both McKee and his employer, which were relied
upon by McKee. We do not think it should be said that
reliance upon the pipe plant's own representative worked
a forfeiture of McKee's claim and thus a substantial gain
to the pipe company.
If the doctor intentionally misled the applicant, it would
be unthinkable that his company should be permitted to
benefit. If he did so carelessly or wantonly, without intending the result, it would still be contrary to fundamental principles of justice that the company should be able to take
advantage of the carelessness of its own doctor to bar a
valid claim. The doctor was the only one who had access to
the x-rays, and Dr. Richards testified those x-rays showed
the back condition. Then, even in 1947, when the back
condition became known, the company withheld Dr. Taylor's x-rays and other information from the applicant. Will
the law permit a company to mislead an employee and then
bar a valid claim because the applicant was, in fact, misled? Such would seem contrary to public policy. We submit that the statute of limitations has been waived and that
the company is estopped to raise or rely upon it by reason
of the facts and circumstances shown without dispute in
the record.
No one now contends that Dr. Taylor was right in telling McKee his back was all right, and his trouble was muscular spasms. and rheumatism, or lumbago. The company,
in view of Dr. Taylor's own letter, cannot claim this. The
undisputed evidence is that Dr. Taylor's x-rays showed the
same condition as is now shown on the Orton x-rays and
the Richards x-rays. Not only were Dr. Taylor's x-rays
withheld from McKee, but an affirmative misrepresentation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as to what the x-rays showed was made by the company
doctor acting in the course of his employment. It is significant to note, as Dr. Richards established, that as a rule
rheumatism over a substantial period of time has an effect
on the bone structure, and that there was no indication of
rheumatism on the x-rays (166).
The applicant is in serious condition, which now everyone admits is not merely rheumatism or muscular spasms.
If Dr. Taylor had been right in his statement, applicant
would not have been entitled to compensation. Applicant
believed, and had the right to rely upon, Dr. Taylor. Dr.
Orton relied upon Dr. Taylor, because Dr. Taylor was the
only one who had seen and x-rays up until 1946.
Now, the company should not say to the applicant:
"Our doctor was in error when he told you your back
was all right. Although he had the correct infonnation in the x-rays themselves, and you relied upon him,
wa will take advantage of your belief in our agent.
Not only will you have to put up with the extra years
of suffering, but you cannot even now secure relief or
help because our agent was wrong and you believed
him. We claim the right to hide behind th,e mistake of
our doctor, work a substantial enrichment of ourselves,
and bar you from help which may mean your life!"
Such a position, if that be the position of defendant,
is untenable in law or equity. Yet, unless that be the position of defendant, they must admit liability, as a proper
claim was filed well within three years from the discovery
that Dr. Taylor was wrong.
It is heartening again to find in this connection from
the adjudicated cases that the law, while of necessity deal-
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ing in general, and sometimes rigid rules, regards basic justice as of supreme importance. Fundamental justice, we
submit, requires that McKee receive compensation. The
authorities, recognizing that the rules of law are intended,
and should tie applied, to promote justice, and not to facilitate injustice, so indicate.
It has long been recognized by the statutes of this state
L.'1at an action based on fraud or mistake will not be deemed
to have accrued until the discovery of the facts constituting
the fraud or mistake. 104-2-24 (3), UCA, 19;1:3. The rule
_that the defendant having, by his own wrongdoing, prevented plaintiff from instituting his suit, will not be permitted
to take advantage of his own wrong by setting up the statute of lin1itations as a defense, is applicable irrespective of
whether the action itself is based on fraud. Pashley vs.
Pacific Electric Co., et al (Calif.) 153 P. 2d 325; Peteler v.
Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P. 2d 244.
Where physicians are employed by a company to treat
an injured person, the physicians, nevertheless, as to such
person, occupy a position of trust and confidence, and their
concealment of the seriousness of the injuries will be imputed to the company in determining whether the statute
of limitation was tolled against the company. Pashley v.
Pacific Electric Co., et al, supra.
Under the general rules of law governing all classes of
cases, concealment, or even mistake, may toll the statute
of limitations. (See annotation "Limitations-Effect of
Concealment", 173 ALR 576.) But particularly, in the case
of an application for industrial compensation would it seem
that every protection against over-reaching by employers
or their agents should be afforded. Such protection should
not require the presence of fraud in the strict sense. No
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employer in this type of case should be permitted to benefit at the expense of its employees by any questionable circumstances such as herein involved.
We call attention to the New Mexico case of Anderson
v. Contract Trucking Co., supra, which adapts the reasoning of Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, supra, to
the effect that the statute should not be interpreted to require the period of limitations to "begin to run before the
cause of action accrues". But it is with respect to estoppel
that this case seems especially pertinent, and we quote from
the opinion of the Court on this point:
"But, say defendants, even should this court apply the rule that the statute starts running from the
date the injury becomes apparent as one compensable,
rather than from the date of the accident, still plaintiff could not recover. He knew, say defendants, at
least as early as April 18, 1941, when he secured glasses from an optometrist, that his eyesight was somewhat impaired and therefore the claim should have
been filed at least within a year and thirty-one days
thereafter. We are unable to agree to the soundness
of this contention. It was not until plaintiff had consulted an eye specialist that he discovered that his eyesight was practically gone. Then, for the first time,
the growing weakness of the eye was traced to the accident of Nov., 1940, which accident, plaintiff had been
led to believe by the doctor who examined him at the
time (the doctor of the employer, incidentally) , could
not have set in motion an effect leading to impairment
of vision. We need not set out herein more detail than
is shown in the trial court's findings the action of plaintiff prior to seeking the advice of the eye specialist
in seeking to correct 'his failing vision. Plaintiff could
well have attributed this growing eye weakness to natural causes and advancing age. We cannot say that
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there was not substantial evidence to support the trial
court's finding that he did not know, or have reason
to know, prior to the time the specialist had seen him
that he had suffered this serious injury which would
progress to total blindness."
And from the special concurring opinion of Justice
Bickley in the same case:
"A notable illustration is the Mumford case, supra, in which it was apparent from the time of the accident that the injury was compensable. The claim alleged: 'Such injury has caused the complete loss of the
sight of the left eye caused by the splashing of hot
creosote * * *'. The answer of the insurer stated:
' * * * admits the allegations in said claim', but
denied liability for the reason, 'that said employer had
actual knowledge of said injury within two weeks
after the occurrence thereof and no compensation nor
any part thereof was paid by said employer or this defendant within thirty-one days after the date of said
accident and injury.'
"Thus, the defendant in that case, with keen discrimination, fixes the time of the failure or refusal to
pay as the starting point of the limitation period for
the purpose of its plea that the claim was barred.

'/

"In the case at bar the situation is quite different.
The defendants here state that the claim is barred because not filed within one year after the occurrence
of the accident and injury or after the refusal or failure of the e1nployer to pay the same. Yet they create
no situation by the evidence to show they had knowledge of a compensable injury from which a refusal or
failure to pay could be inferred. In fact, the only evidence on the subject shows that the defendants disclaim having knowledge of a compensable injury, alSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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though the employer knew of the accident and of the
injury, in the sense of physical harm and disturbance
of the eye. But they regarded the injury as a trivial
one and hence non-compensable."
There is a similar anomaly here. The pipe plant, although their foreman knew applicant left work following
the accident to his back in 1944, is in no position to say that
it, not to mention McKee, knew of any compensable disability to the back, since McKee was released because of
"rheumatism and muscular spasms" after being assured
that there was nothing wrong with his back. We draw attention to the peculiar position in which the pipe plant now
finds itself in contending that McKee is now barred from
claiming compensation for a compensable injury which it,
up to the time of the hearing, represented did not exist!
But the controlling point is that it is estopped from claiming
the benefit of the statute of limitations by reason of the
circumstances hereinbefore discussed.
CONCLUSION

We submit that compensation should be allowed. Only
by this action will the intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act be served, fairness promoted and the applicant
furnished means, in accordance with law, through operative procedure recommended by Dr. Richards, to save himself from total paralysis, or even more serious consequences.
The claim of the applicant not being barred, and the
applicant otherwise being entitled to compensation by the
great weight of the evidence and in accordance with the
findings of the Commission, we submit that the decision
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of the Commission should be reversed with respect to the
statute of limitations, and that it should be ordered to grant
compensation and n1edical expenses to the applicant as provided by law.
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Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON,
Attorneys for Applicant
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